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California Civil Code Section 3264 and
the Ghost of the Equitable Lien
By PAUL D. GUTIERREZ*

The construction of a work of improvement' on real property usually requires the participation of many parties. If the developer of a
construction project does not have the capital to finance the entire construction effort,2 the developer must borrow to complete the project.
The construction lender3 , whose function in such an endeavor is to loan
money at interest, usually requires as security for the loan a first lien on
the real property itself. The owner of the property executes a deed of
trust, arranging to subordinate other encumbrances, 4 thereby providing
the construction lender with the necessary security interest in the property. With the first deed of trust securing its loan, the lender places
construction loan funds into a construction loan account, from which
periodic disbursements are made as actual construction progresses.
A.B., 1972, California State University, Long Beach; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law
School; Member, American Bar Association; Member, State Bar of California; Member, Bar
Association of San Francisco.
1. "Work of improvement" is broadly defined in CAL. CIV. CODE § 3106 (West 1974):
"'Work of improvement' includes but is not restricted to the construction, alteration, addition to, or repair, in whole or in part, of any building, wharf, bridge, ditch, flume, aqueduct,
well, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, or road, the seeding, sodding, or planting of any lot
or tract of land for landscaping purposes, the filling, leveling, or grading of any lot or tract of
land, the demolition of buildings, and the removal of buildings. Except as otherwise provided in this title, 'work of improvement' means the entire structure or scheme of improvement as a whole." However, for reasons of simplicity this Article will address primarily the
construction of buildings and other structures on real property.
2. M. MARSH, CALIFORNIA MECHANIcs' LIEN LAW HANDBOOK § 9.1 (2d ed. 1972)
*

[hereinafter cited as

MARSH].

3. "'Construction lender' means any mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust
lending funds with which the cost of the work of improvement is, wholly or in part, to be
defrayed, or any assignee or successor in interest of either, or any escrow holder or other
party holding any funds furnished or to be furnished by the owner or lender or any other
person as a fund from which to pay construction costs." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3087 (West
1974).
4. See generally CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS'
LIENS AND OTHER REMEDIES § 8.13 (1972); Lefcoe & Schaffer, ConstructionLendingandthe
Equitable Lien, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 439, 440 n.4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lefcoe &
Schaffer].
[4931
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The borrower of construction funds, if not a builder himself, engages a general contractor5 to construct the actual work of improvement. The general contractor, however, must in turn enter into
separate contracts with materialmen 6 who supply specific building
materials such as lumber and insulation, and subcontractors 7 who perform more specialized types of construction such as plumbing and electrical wiring. The method of disbursement agreed upon between the
borrower and the lender, sometimes with the participation of the gen-

eral contractor, varies in the construction industry.8 For example,
under the voucher method, 9 each subcontractor, laborer, 10 and materi-

alman bills the general contractor as work is performed. The general
contractor in turn requests, by voucher or other procedure, that the
construction lender disburse to the general contractor funds from the
construction loan account to reimburse the general contractor's payments to the subcontractors and materialmen. After routine, periodic
inspections to insure that construction is progressing in accordance
with both the disbursement requests and the plans and specifications,"

the lender disburses monies to the general contractor.
If for some reason the general contractor fails to pay the laborers
and materialmen for the work performed, specific statutory remedies
are available. For example, subcontractors and materialmen may seek
to foreclose a mechanics' lien' 2 directly on the real property itself and
5. The Civil Code defines "original contractor" as any contractor who has a direct
contractual relationship with the owner of the real property. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3095 (West
1974). For the purpose of this Article, "general contractor" and "original contractor" are
used interchangeably.
6. " 'Materialman' means any person who furnishes materials or supplies to be used
or consumed in any work of improvement." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3090 (West 1974).
7. " 'Subcontractor' means any contractor who has no direct contractual relationship
with the owner." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3104 (West 1974).
8. See W. BIEL & C. SENEKER, 12 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE
§ 420.91[4] (1977) [hereinafter cited as BIEL & SENEKER]. The method of disbursing loan
funds is usually set forth in the construction loan agreement.
9. Id. See also Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 451.
10. " 'Laborer' means any person who, acting as an employee, performs labor upon or
bestows skill or other necessary services on any work of improvement." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3089 (West 1974).
11. Approval of the plans and specifications of the project and periodic inspections of
actual construction prior to disbursing loan funds are considered normal procedures for any
construction lender. Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. App. 2d 466, 475, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407
(1969).
12. The California mechanics' lien is explicitly recognized in the California Constitution, CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3, and is set forth in the California Civil Code, CAL. Crv.
CODE §§ 3082-3153 (West 1974). In August 1976, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that the state's mechanics' lien law constituted a "taking" of property by state action
which satisfied the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment of the
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thereby encumber the land for the payment of money due.13 As a practical matter, however, the mechanics' lien can prove to be an ineffective
remedy, because the construction lender usually has obtained a first
deed of trust on the property as a condition of making the loan prior to
the arising of the subcontractor's rights. 14 A foreclosure on the lender's
first deed of trust effectively eliminates all the mechanics' lien claims of
the subcontractors and materialmenl 5 whose
interests were perfected
16
subsequent to the lender's deed of trust.
Mindful of the limited effectiveness of the mechanics' lien as a
remedy, claimants1 7 may seek to assert a right directly to the construction loan fund set up by the lender for the purpose of paying cQnstruction costs. By serving a stop notice18 on the construction lender,
accompanied by a sufficient bond,19 a claimant may require the lender
to withhold funds from the construction account sufficient to pay the
claim. 20 Once the lender receives the bonded stop notice, it must withhold the specified loan funds under risk of personal liability. 21
United States Constitution. Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d
637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976).
13. See Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 808, 553 P.2d 637, 640,
132 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1976).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West 1974). The mechanics' lien takes priority over all
encumbrances perfected subsequent to the recordation of the lien claim. Id. § 3137.
15. See MARSH, supra note 2, § 4.57; Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 265 Cal. App. 2d 490, 499, 71 Cal. Rptr. 422, 428 (1968).
16. In some instances mechanics' lien claimants may all enforce their liens on the property prior to the lender's deed of trust if it can be established that the work of improvement
"commenced" prior to the deed's recordation date. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West 1974).
"Commencement" for the purposes of lien priority is a term of art. See English v. Olympic
Auditorium, Inc., 217 Cal. 631, 20 P.2d 946 (1933). A discussion of commencement of work
as it relates to the enforcement of claimants' rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3085 (West 1974).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3103 (West 1974). As with the mechanics' lien and on the same
grounds, the court in Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637,
132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976), upheld the constitutionality of the California stop notice remedy.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3083 (West 1974) requires that the bond accompanying a stop
notice be in a "sum equal to 1-1/4 times the amount of [the] claim."
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3162 (WEsT 1974).
21. Id. Section 3162 states that "[upon] receipt of a bonded stop notice. . . the construction lender shall withhold from the borrower... sufficient money to answer such
claim." (emphasis added) See also Rossman Mill & Lumber Co. v. Fullerton Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 221 Cal. App. 2d 705, 34 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1963). The receipt of an unbonded stop
notice may be ignored by the construction lender. Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 803, 809, 553 P.2d 637, 641, 132 Cal.Rptr. 477, 481 (1976); MARSH, supra note 2, §
5.11. However, the duty to withhold funds pursuant to a bonded stop notice cannot be
abrogated by contrary provisions of the construction loan agreement. A-1 Door & Materials
Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d 728, 394 P.2d 829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85

(1964).
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Situations have frequently arisen, however, when a claimant has
failed to serve a bonded stop notice on the lender and, after the time for
such service has expired,2 2 nevertheless has attempted to assert some
entitlement to monies in the construction loan account outside of the
stop notice procedure. Too, some claimants have sought to enforce
other legal or equitable rights to the construction loan fund in addition
to enforcing a bonded stop notice.
The theories submitted by such claimants ultimately resulted in
the California Supreme Court's acknowledgment in 192823 that claimants who have supplied their labor and materials to a project in reliance upon the existence of the construction loan fund may claim a lien
in equity on the loan fund itself. Recognition of an equitable lien on
the loan fund effectively rendered superfluous the stop notice procedure and encouraged many claimants to ignore the bonded stop notice
as a method of obtaining money from the loan fund. 24 Such claimants
could usually obtain loan funds2 5 from the loan account by way of this
equitable lien because most subcontractors and materialmen furnishing
labor, equipment or materials to the construction project do actually
rely, to some extent, on the existence of the construction loan fund.
The equitable lien doctrine flourished until the legislature
amended the stop notice statute in 1967. The new provision, subdivision (n) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1, ostensibly provided
that the equitable lien could no longer be asserted against the construction loan fund and limited the remedies of claimants to the stop notice
procedures provided by law.
Although this provision, now recodified as Civil Code section
3264, has received limited judicial analysis, some decisions addressing
the statute contain confusing and superfluous discussion, which in turn
gives many claimants hope that a remnant of the equitable lien survives. Indeed, litigants seeking to reach the loan fund include in their
pleadings almost as a matter of course a variety of legal theories in
22. The time for service of a stop notice on a construction lender is the same as that
provided for the mechanics' lien. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3116, 3159 (1974). However, it
cannot be served except for payment for work already performed or materials already furnished. MARSH, supra note 2, § 5.14; Burden, Stop Notices andEquitableLiens.'A Revolution
in Private Construction Work Remedies, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 225, 229 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Burden]; Hunt, The Stop Notice Remedy in California, 38 L.A.B. BULL. 16, 17 (1962).
23. Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 P. 898 (1928). See text
accompanying notes 27-36 infra.
24. Note, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 1246, 1248 (1965).
25. A. BowMAN, 2 OGDEN'S REVISED CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW § 20.47
(C.E.B. 1975).
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addition to their mechanics' lien and stop notice rights. In addition to
the equitable lien, these theories include 26 claims of negligent disbursement of construction loan funds, negligent entrustment, constructive
trust, and concealment of loan funds. Trial courts are frequently reluctant to dispose summarily of such theories at the pleading stage, with
the result that the construction lender must prepare and meet at the
pretrial stage each of the theories asserted. It is the contention of this
Article, however, that the language of Civil Code section 3264 is unambiguous, 27 and should be applied as such by the courts. Discussion of
the statute's effect on the equitable lien requires review and analysis of
the equitable lien as well as the language of the statute itself. The Article will then investigate the statutory history of Civil Code section
3264, discuss the few rulings on the statute and comment on the statute's strengths and weaknesses as a measure designed to legitimize and
enforce the stop notice as the primary remedy to be asserted against the
construction loan fund.

The Growth of the Equitable Lien
In the 1928 case of Smith v. Anglo-CaliforniaTrust Co.,28s the California Supreme Court recognized a new remedy to be afforded lien
claimants under certain circumstances. There, Smith purchased five
parcels of real property, obtaining from a securities company a construction loan of $20,000 which he intended to use to improve the property. As security for the loan, Smith executed and delivered to the
lender a first deed of trust covering the five parcels. Thereafter, the
lender set up a construction loan account, from which periodic disbursements were made to Smith as the construction progressed.
Shortly after the construction was completed Smith died and his widow
became the administratrix of his estate; at that time, $4,090 of undisbursed funds remained in the construction loan account. Liens totalling approximately $5,663 for the value of labor and materials
furnished but not paid for were filed against the property. The claimants demanded that the lender withhold from the undisbursed loan
29
funds an amount sufficient to meet their claims.
Smith's administratrix instituted an action to recover undisbursed
loan funds from the lender and the trial court upheld her entitlement to
26. See generally CONTINUING

EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MEcHANIcs'

LIENs AND OTHER RFMEDIES § 8.31 (1972).

27. See note 139 infra.
28. 205 Cal. 496, 271 P. 898 (1928).
29. Id. at 498-99, 271 P. at 899.
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the money. The lower court also decreed that the lender's deed of trust
was a first lien or charge on the real property and superior to the other
30
claims.
On appeal by several of the unsatisfied lien claimants, the supreme
court, in determining which of the claimants were entitled to the undisbursed loan funds, observed that nothing in the agreement between
Smith and the lender obligated the lender to assure that the funds ad3
vanced to Smith would be used to pay the laborers and materialmen. '
Consequently, the lender's disbursements to Smith created no liability
on the part of the lender to the lien claimants, and any rights of such
claimants to the undisbursed funds could not be based on a trust resulting from the terms of the construction loan agreement. 32 Furthermore,
the court commented, the claimants could not assert a right to the excess loan funds on a theory that they were third party beneficiaries of
the loan agreement. 33 Nonetheless, the court held:
We are of the view that the money remaining undisbursed in the
building loan account opened in Smith's name by the [lender]
should, in accordance with established principles of equity, be so
charged. And this by reason of those special circumstances and conditions consisting of representations and conduct upon one side and
of action founded thereon upon the other. That the lien claimants
must have relied upon the fund to be advanced to Smith by the
[lender], and not alone upon the individual capacity of Smith or their
right to a last lien upon the premises, as a means of obtaining payment for their labor and materials, is supported by every 34reasonable
inference deducible from the surrounding circumstances.
The court was persuaded by the particular facts of the case, observing that the work of improvement was completed in substantial
compliance with the plans and specifications; that but for the existence
of the loan the claimants would not have extended Smith credit for
30. Id. at 499-500, 271 P. at 900. On appeal, the supreme court agreed that the lender
did have a first lien on the property by recognizing that the lender, under its agreement with
Smith, became obligated to Smith for the full amount of the construction loan, described by
the court as a sum certain rather than an undetermined or an optional amount. Id. at 50001, 271 P. at 900.
31. Id. at 502, 271 P. at 901.
32. Id. In Whiting-Mead Co. v. West Coast Bond & Mortgage Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d
460, 152 P.2d 629 (1944), the court held that where the construction loan agreement specifies
that the loan funds are to be applied to payments for labor and materials, the funds are held
by the lender in constructive trust for the benefit of the lien claimants. That trust relationship between the lender and the claimant creates a duty on the part of the lender to apply
any remaining construction loan funds to the payment of claims for labor and materials
regardless of whether the claimants seek to perfect their mechanics' lien claims by bringing
an action thereon.
33. 205 Cal. at 502, 271 P. at 901.
34. Id. at 502-03, 271 P. at 901.
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their labor and services and hence had a reasonable expectation of being paid from the loan funds; that the lender and Smith should both
have known that their construction loan agreement "would constitute a
material inducement to [the claimants] in supplying labor and materials." 35 This situation constituted "special circumstances" which warranted the imposition of a lien, in equity, on the undisbursed loan
funds in favor of the lien claimants.
The court ultimately concluded that the trial court should have
ordered that the lender pay36over to the appellants the undisbursed loan
funds on a pro rata basis.
The court in Smith recognized the importance of an equitable lien
on construction loan funds as a method of granting relief to laborers
and materialmen who might have otherwise gone unpaid for services
and materials supplied to a construction project. The object of such a
remedy was to prevent the lender or the borrower from being unjustly
enriched by undisbursed loan funds at the expense of laborers and materialmen who parted with services or materials to improve real
7
property.3
In Pacific Ready Cut Homes v. Title Insurance& Trust Co.,38 the
supreme court, restating its holding in Smith, made clear its concern
over the situation when, having induced materialmen or subcontractors
to rely on the existence of the loan fund, the construction lender then
reaped the sole advantage after default due to the increase in the value
of its security. The facts of the case revealed that the owners of the
property and a representative of the lender had informed the claimant
that the construction loan funds had been obtained and represented
that materials and labor would be paid for out of the loan fund. 39 Consequently, the "justifiable reliance" of the lien claimants on the existence of the loan fund was clear and proved to be the keystone of the
opinion. 40 The court's ruling emphasized the combination of induced
35. Id.
36. Id. at 504, 271 P. at 902. In Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Coast Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 47 Cal. App. 2d 211, 117 P.2d 682 (1941), the court of appeal held that a claimant need not bring suit on his mechanics' lien claim to share in the pro rata distribution of
unexpended loan funds. The enforcement of a lien in equity did not require that a claimant
move to foreclose on that statutory remedy to be "among those persons having legally and
satisfactorily established their lien claims." Id. at 213, 117 P.2d at 683 (quoting Smith v.
Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 504, 271 P. 898, 902 (1928)).
37. 3 B. WrrKiN, SuwetRY OF CALiFORNiA LAW, Securiy Transactions in Real
Propery, § 17 (8th ed. 1973).
38. 216 Cal. 447, 14 P.2d 510 (1932).
39. Id. at 451, 14 P.2d at 511.
40. d. at 450, 14 P.2d at 511.
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reliance and unjust enrichment:
The defendant mortgage company, having received the benefit of
plaintiffs performance in the form of a completed building and
therefore a more valuable security for its note, is not justified in withholding or appropriating to any other use money originally intended
to be used to pay for such performance,
and relied upon by plaintiff
41
in rendering its performance.
The Smith and Pacfic cases indicate that the doctrine of the equitable lien would be applied in situations attended by certain factual
circumstances: 42 (1) the work of the improvement was completed; 43 (2)
the value of the improvement subject to the lender's prior security interest at least equalled the loan amount; 44 (3) the claimant actually relied upon the loan fund in supplying his labor and materials; 45 and (4)
retention of unexpected construction loan funds by either the lender or
the borrower would amount to an unjust enrichment at the expense of
the claimant. 46 Significantly, although in Pacfic there was clear evidence of induced reliance, Smith indicated that even a tenuous showing
of reliance would suffice. In that case, the court felt that the mere existence of the construction loan agreement, secured by an encumbrance of
record, made it "reasonable to conclude that the mechanics' lien claimants. . . must have relied upon. . . the agreement. ' '47 Although the
court in Smith based its conclusions on "representations and conduct, ' '4 8 no verbal assurances of payment from the loan fund were discussed; it was nonetheless held that the element of reliance was
"supported by every reasonable inference deducible from the sur41. Id. at 452, 14 P.2d at 512.
42. See Comment, Security Transactions:Mechanic's Equitable Lien on Construction
Loan Funds,5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 69, 70 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Security Transactions].

43. See Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 503, 271 P. 898, 901 (1928).
"In cases where there is no completed building, the only security the lender has for the
undisbursed portion of its full loan commitment is the right to retain the undisbursed funds
until it has the security for which it bargained. Depriving the lender of that right does not
prevent unjust enrichment, if the cost of completing the improvements is equal to or more
than that amount remaining undisbursed in the loan account." Security Transactions,supra
note 42, at 72.
44. See Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 499, 271 P. 898, 899 (1928);
Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 448, 14 P.2d 510 (1932).
45.

See Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 502, 271 P. 898, 901 (1928);

Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 451, 14 P.2d 510, 512
(1932).
46. See Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 504, 271 P. 898, 902 (1928);
Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447, 452, 14 P.2d 510, 512
(1932).
47. Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 501, 271 P. 898, 900-01 (1928).
48. Id. at 502, 271 P. at 901.

January 1979]

SECTION 3264 AND EQUITABLE LIENS

rounding circumstances." 49 The Pacific court impliedly affirmed the

adequacy of this showing by commenting that "[t]he distinguishing
facts of the two cases are not, in our opinion, significant."5 o
The scope of the equitable lien as expounded in Smith was later
limited by the California Supreme Court in4-1 Door& MaterialsCo. v.
Fresno GuaranteeSavings & Loan Association.51 In A-lDoor, construction had been halted before completion of the improvement.5 2 The
lender argued that the undistributed loan funds could be used either to

reduce the borrower's debt or to finish the work of improvement.
While upholding the rights of the claimants who had served bonded

stop notices, the Court denied recovery to equitable lien claimants who
had only filed mechanics' liens. These latter claimants had contended

that by virtue of the filing of such mechanics' liens, they had established their right to an equitable lien on the loan fund. 53 Rejecting that

argument, the Court held that a claim to loan funds by way of an equitable lien had to be supported by a showing of inducement and reliance
on the loan account:
An equitable lien may be imposed on a construction-loan fund only
if it is established that the borrower or lender induced the supplier of
labor or materials to rely on the fund for payment. (Smith v. AngloCaliforniaTrust Co.,... PaciicReady Cut Homes, Inc. v. Title Ins.
& Trust Co..... ) There is no evidence in the record of any reliance on the loan funds or of any inducement so to rely. Nor is there
any evidence from which reliance may be reasonably inferred.
49. Id. at 503, 271 P. at 901. The court held that, absent a duty created by the loan
agreement which obligated the lender to assure that loan funds were used to pay laborers
and materialmen, such claimants could not gain access to unexpended loan funds by way of
imposition of a trust relationship between the lender and the claimant with regard to the
loan account. In 1944, however, the court in Whiting-Mead Co. v. West Coast Bond &
Mortgage Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 460, 152 P.2d 629 (1944), held that when such an obligation
does arise from the loan agreement a trust is created. Id. at 464, 152 P.2d at 631. The lender
must then hold the loan funds in trust for the beneficiaries of the loan agreement. Later in
Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 2d 433, 31 Cal. Rptr. 174
(1963), the court applied the Whiting-Mead rationale. "IT]he lender having a completed
structure, and its trust deed having priority over the claims of suppliers of labor and materials, the purpose of the trust with respect to the lender was accomplished. The lender had no
right to the remaining funds. There, as in the present case, it was the duty of the trustee
[lender] to apply the remaining funds to the unpaid claims for labor and materials used in
the construction." Id. at 436, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
50. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447,451, 14 P.2d 510,
512 (1932).
51. 61 Cal. 2d 728, 394 P.2d 829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964).
52. Id. at 731, 394 P.2d at 831, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
53. Id. at 732, 394 P.2d at 832, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 88. In support of their position, claimants cited Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Coast Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 47 Cal.App. 2d
211, 117 P.2d 682 (1941).
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(Compare Smith v. Anglo-CaiforniaTrust Co.....)54
Thus, while the court compared its holding with the inference drawn by
the Smith court, the "special circumstances and conditions" 55 in that
case amounted solely to the facts that a loan agreement had been entered into, and the lender's deed of trust was a recorded encumbrance
on the property.5 6 Presumably, the A-1 Door court now found these
facts insufficient to create an inference of inducement and reliance on
the loan fund sufficient to recognize an equitable lien. Instead, by implication the court found that one factor necessary to show such reliance is substantial completion of the improvement, that is, that the
lender, as in the Pacific case, will be unjustly enriched. The court distinguished the facts in A-1 Door from those in Smith. The Smith court
had noted that the structures involved had been "completed in substantial compliance with the plans and specifications"; 57 in A-1Door, however, the work of improvement had not been completed and hence
58
neither the lender nor the claimant received the object of its bargain.
Thus, A-1Door did not reject the equitable lien doctrine but rather limited the situations in which it would be recognized without a claimant's
compliance with the stop notice requirements, to some degree thereby
encouraging the use of the bonded stop notice as a remedy for laborers
and materiamen.5 9 After A-1 Door, the filing of a mechanics' lien on
the property did not by itself entitle a claimant to share pro rata in
construction loan funds by way of the equitable lien.
Nonetheless, in 1965, the equitable lien doctrine received a broad
endorsement by the California Court of Appeal in Miller v. Mountain
View Savings & Loan Association.60 There the work of improvement
was not completed because the claimant had stopped work when he did
not receive payment for his labor and material. Upon learning that
construction had halted, the lender applied the balance of the construction loan account against the balance due on the principal debt.6' By
the time the lender received the claimant's unbonded stop notice, the
assignment of funds had already occurred. 62 Exercising its rights under
a first deed of trust, the lender then foreclosed, purchased the property
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

61 Cal. 2d at 732, 394 P.2d at 832, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (citations omitted).
Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 502, 271 P. 898, 901 (1928).
Id. at 503, 271 P. at 901.

Id.
See Note, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1246, 1249 (1965).
Id. at 1251.
238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1965).
Id. at 649-50, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
Id. at 655, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
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at the foreclosure sale, and subsequently resold it at a profit more than
sufficient to cover the plaintiff's claim.
The court ruled on three issues, two of which are important to our
discussion: first, whether the lien claimant obtained a legal right to loan
funds by the filing of a stop notice without a bond; second, whether the
unbonded stop notice was sufficient for the imposition of an equitable
lien in that amount against the loan funds.
The issue of the sufficiency of the filing of the unbonded stop notice was easily disposed of by the court. The opinion discussed at
length the relative positions of the lien claimant, the borrower and the
construction lender under mechanics' lien law, and noted as well that
the stop notice and the mechanics' lien remedies are cumulative and
independent of one another. Although the court recognized that public
policy might militate against providing the unbonded stop notice
claimant less protection than the bonded claimant, the statute then in
effect, Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1 subdivision (h), dictated
that result:
The statutory remedy ...

is, however, in derogation of the generally

acknowledged right of the lender to contract for a lien which is superior to the rights of lien claimants in the property. If his rights are to
be cut down, and he is in effect required to make a forced advance, it
must be done in the manner provided by statute and a bond must be
furnished ....

It is concluded that respondent's failure to file a

63
bond precludes him from seeking relief under the statute.
However, the court's ruling on the statutory sufficiency of the stop
notice did not preclude the claimant's assertion of an equitable lien on
the loan fund--the second substantive issue. The court stated that
when the lender receives the benefit of the claimant's performance,
thereby enhancing the lender's security, the lender is not justified in
appropriating money originally intended and relied upon by the claimant for the payment of the claimant's performance. 4 The fact that the
lender had applied the loan balance against the principal prior to the
receipt of the claimant's stop notice did not preclude the imposition of
the equitable lien:
The statutory provisions invalidate as to a claimant an assignment whether made before or after a verified claim is filed. Assertion of the lender's rights by virtue of his contract with the borrower
must await the running of the period in which claims may be filed,
and they yield priority to such claims as are filed.65

63. Id. at 661, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 657,48 Cal. Rptr. at 287. The statute then in effect, former CAL. CIV. PRoc.
§ 1190.1(h), is now set forth at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3166 (West 1974). See Hunt, The

CODE
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Reliance upon the loan fund could not be supported by the mere
filing of the mechanics' lien claim. Rather, the court held that there
must be "direct evidence of inducement or reliance or other facts from
which either reasonably may be inferred" 66 before an equitable lien
may be imposed.
The court then turned to the facts of the case. The lower court had
found that the claimant had performed "in reliance upon the building
and loan fund. '67 The claimant was aware that the borrower had obtained the loan, but the details of the borrower's arrangements with the
lender were unknown. 68 The lender and the borrower had engaged
Empire Builders Control as an independent company whose function
was to disburse the loan funds. All disbursements and loan payments
were made through Empire, and the claimant testified at trial that he
expected to get paid because the matter was being handled by Empire. 69 On this basis, the court affirmed the trial court's holding that an
equitable lien existed in favor of the claimant:
The foregoing evidence permits the inference that Empire was
used as some sort of escrow agent representing subcontractors and
others furnishing labor and materials to the five lots, the owner, and
the lender. Presumably Empire knew where the money was coming
from, and the lender knew that those dealing with Empire were looking to it for payment. In setting up this system of making payments
appellant can be charged with inducing reliance on the payments it
would make, and respondent can be said to have relied on the payments to be made to its escrow agent by a70financial institution, even
though he did not then know its identity.
The court in Miller was not constrained to limit its ruling by the
fact that the work of improvement was not completed; rather, the court
justified the imposition of an equitable lien on the loan fund by observing that A-1 Door "did not indicate that an equitable lien could not
exist in the absence of a completed building."'7 1 Too, the court reaMiller Case.-Claimant'sDelight Lender's Fright,41 L.A.B. BULL. 262, 265 (1966): "From this

language the court held that a stop notice or equitable lien claimant will have priority over
the lender's application of undisbursed loan funds to the loan whether such application is
made before or after the filing of the stop notice or equitable lien claim. Thus the lender
must wait until the expiration of the period for filing stop notices and equitable liens before
knowing for certain that an assignment of undisbursed loan funds to reduction of the loan
will not be set aside."
66. Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 662, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 278, 291 (1965).
67. Id. at 649, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
68. Id. at 663, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 664, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (emphasis added).
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soned that, because the Pacific court had refused to recognize a lender's
right to offset undisbursed loan funds against the principal loan
amount, "[ilt is no great step to conclude that such offset should not be
allowed even though the building is not complete. .

.

. All other fac-

tors being equal the rights of one contributing to the construction
should not depend on the stage thereof at which his contribution was
made.

72

It is important to observe that the Miller court, by recognizing the
right of an unbonded stop notice claimant to assert an equitable lien to
the loan funds, attenuated to some extent the holding inA-1 Door. The
significance of compliance with the stop notice procedures provided by
California law, noted in the 4-1 Door opinion, was substantially weakened by allowing the service of an unbonded stop notice on the lender
to have the same effect as a bonded stop notice for the purpose of imposing an equitable lien. By so holding, Miller wedged the equitablelien doctrine more firmly into mechanics' lien law.
Miller left many issues unresolved. One commentator observed
that the opinion left unanswered questions of what evidence will support an equitable lien and what procedures must be followed to perfect
an equitable lien.73 The author also suggested that the case had neglected specifically to address whether the bonded, stop notice claimant
had priority over the equitable lien claimant. 74 He concluded that an
equitable lien was most probably subordinate to a bonded stop notice,
although superior to the right of a construction lender to apply
unexpended loan funds to complete the structure or reduce the balance
75
of the main debt after default.
In sum, the cornerstone of this series of decisions upholding the
concept of the equitable lien on unexpended loan funds has been reliance on a construction loan fund.7 6 Inducement has been found on a
wide array of facts. In Smith, reliance was demonstrated merely by
virtue of the fact that a construction loan agreement had been entered
into. In Pacfic, the requirement was satisfied by representations made
to the claimant by both the owner and representatives of the lender.
72. Id. The third issue presented to the court was the effect of the lender's purchase of
the real property at a trustee sale after foreclosure and the resale of the property at a substantial profit. Determination of this issue was precluded by the holding on the first two
issues. Id. at 665, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
73. Hunt, The Miller Case: Claimant's Delight Lender's Fright, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 262,
265 (1966).
74. Id. at 298.
75. Id. at 299.
76. See generaly Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 848 (1973).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

Finally, in Miller, the creation of an arrangement whereby disbursements were made by an escrow agent known and expected to be the
source of payment to subcontractors and materialmen was sufficient to
infer induced reliance on the loan fund.
A sharp departure from this trend occurred in a case decided by
the California Court of Appeal shortly after Miller. In McBain v. Santa
ClaraSavings & Loan Association,77 an equitable lien was created on
the theory of reliance on the loan fund; but the court broadened this
theory of recovery by declining to require that such reliance be induced
by the lender. The facts indicated that the lien claimants had relied on
the borrower's representations as to the expected source of payment,
78
even though the lender was not alleged to have made representations.
The court held the facts sufficient to impose an equitable lien in favor
of the lien claimant:
We think that the equitable principles given recognition in
Smith, Ready Cut Homes and A-I Door justify the conclusion that,
where suppliers of labor or materials have been induced to rely on
the loan fund by either the borrower or the lender, their equitable
liens on the fund should have priority over the claims of both of such
last mentioned persons to the fund. Basically it is the fund itself and
the arrangement for progress payments therefrom, created by the
mutual agreement of the borrower and the lender, that constitutes
79
the material inducement to the subcontractors and materialmen.
A two-fold justification was offered for this result. The court reasoned, first, that the lender "had already protected itself with a first
priority encumbrance on the property." 80 Second, the lender controlled both the loan fund and disbursement of the progress payments;
it was therefore in a "commanding position. . . to prevent the diversion or dilution of the progress payments by the owners to the prejudice
of appellants. ' 81 Given the lender's inspection of the property, the
prerequisites for the disbursement of loan funds, and the lender's full
control over the loan account, it could not be said that the lender might
be unaware of the claimant's reliance on the loan fund. No equitable
consideration, the court concluded, could justify the borrower's claiming priority over the claimants; hence, no equitable considerations dictated more favorable treatment to the lender.
It does not seem to us to be consonant with the philosophy expounded in Smith to grant still another prior lien on the loanfunds
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1966).
Id. at 841, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 842, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
Id. at 842, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 86-87.
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themselves to such a lender-fund holder who despite its dominant
position in the arrangements and its apparent sophistication in commercial financing had chosen not to protect its preferred position but
would nevertheless claim the benefits that
the labor and materials of
82
others have contributed to the property.

The major impact of the McBain holding is that the claimants
were given priority to the unexpended loan funds over the lender even
though they were not aware of the lender's identity and their only reliance was upon the borrower's representations. Whether equity required a lien in favor of the claimants no longer depended on precisely
who had induced reliance on the fund, but on the fact that one of the
parties to the "fund which existed by the joint acts and mutual
agreement of both the owners and the lender"8 3 had done so.
In a strong dissent, Justice Sims argued that in the absence of some
estoppel or unjust enrichment attributable to the lender, the law did not
mandate that the lender pay over construction loan funds in a manner
84
to which it did not agree.
Lefcoe and Schaffer 5 likewise criticized what they describe as this
"fault rationale." They point out that materialmen and others similarly
situated have the means to prevent this type of loss;86 in addition, despite elaborate disbursal procedures, borrowers still appear able to mis87
apply loan funds and thereby subject the account to equitable liens.
These commentators concur that equitable estoppel based upon
reliance has been the foundation for the doctrine applied by the courts,
and that such reliance has been easily inferred from even the most attenuated circumstances, on the basis of the respective relationships of
82. Id. at 842, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 843, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (emphasis in original).
84.

"The policy reasons for making the lender an insurer of payment to lien claimants

are persuasive and attractive. The Legislature, however, by acting to create a system
wherein a claimant may protect himself by giving a stop notice, has halted short of adopting
this concept. The courts have been vigilant to protect the claimants where the lender has in
any manner lead them to expect payment from him, but this case would plow fields heretofore left uncultivated. Since the lender must generally look to the land and improvements
for repayment of his original advance and any amounts he is compelled to pay out to equitable lien-holders, the effect of the decision is to give a mechanic's lien claimant a priority over
the lender with the first deed of trust, whenever he can show that the borrower-not necessarily the lender--induced him to rely on the loan fund."
Id. at 848, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
85. Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4.
86. Id. at 442, 446-49.
87. Id. at 442. The authors also suggest that the courts may be employing the concept
of "allocation of resources" to place liability on the party best able to assess costs and insure
against the loss, the construction lender, this allocation concept may represent the courts'
perception that the threat of legal liability may change construction lending policy. Id.
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the participants in the construction project.88 Thus, the equitable lien
cases had the effect of making construction lenders sureties to such
claimants to the extent that undisbursed loan funds existed when a project ceased.89 The natural consequence was, of course, that the construction lender in each case found itself subject to far more liability
than that for which it had bargained. Because of the lender's inability
to apply unexpended construction loan funds to the repayment of the
principal debt until the rights to the equitable lien claimants have been
determined, it thereafter had less incentive to make a construction loan
without some protection that might be afforded outside of its construction loan agreement. The increase in possible exposure for construction lenders would also inevitably result in closer scrutiny of loan
applications, a higher rejection rate for those applicants deemed to be a
higher risk, and a possibly undesirable tightening of the loan market,
with a concomitant brake on construction activity.
The Death of the Equitable Lien
In 1967, the California Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1, adding a new subdivision (n).90 As a result, only
two remedies were available to persons who had not been paid for furnishing labor, services, equipment or materials to a construction project. First, such claimants could avail themselves of the stop notice
remedy, which required specific procedures, timely service and a sufficient bond. Second, a claimant could pursue a right created by a direct,
contractual relationship between the claimant and lender. No other legal or equitable rights could be enforced against the fund.
The legislature apparently had sought to provide relief to construction lenders who, as has been discussed, had heretofore been subjected to increasingly liberal applications of the equitable lien doctrine
by California courts. Some commentators9 1 adopted a "wait and see"
88. Id. at 444-45.
89. Id. at 456.
90. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 789, § I(n), at 2183 (repealed 1969). The statute, which was
approved by the governor and filed with the Secretary of State on July 17, 1967, read as
follows: "The rights of all persons furnishing labor, services, equipment, or materials for any
work of improvement, with respect to any fund for payment of construction costs, are governed exclusively by this article, and no such person may assert any legal or equitable right
with respect to such fund, other than a right created by direct written contract between such
person and the person holding the fund, except pursuant to the provisions of this article."
The legislative response to the equitable lien appeared to some observers to be inevitable.
See, e.g., Burden, supra note 22, at 242.
91.

J. ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 9.40 (2d ed. 1975).
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position with regard to the impact of the legislature's action. Lefcoe
and Schaffer, 92 however, observed that the statutory language might
not be the swan song for the equitable lien. In a postscript, 93 they suggested that the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1 subdivision (n), mandating that the existing rights of claimants were
"pursuant to provisions of this article," could be construed as referring
to the creation of the preliminary notice94-a feature enacted coincidentally in 1967 as an amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section
1193. 95

Such a reading, the authors submitted, would mean that the

only change in the application of the equitable lien doctrine would be
that it necessarily be preceded by the preliminary notice.
That argument vaporized, however, when the mechanics' lien statutes were recodified and subdivision (n) of former Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1 emerged in its present form as Civil Code section
3264.96 After transformation, the statutory language was unequivocal
in its expression of the meaning of the prior words "pursuant to the
provisions of this article." 97 The new section was amended to specify
that claimants' rights to the loan fund "are governed exclusively by
Chapters 3 (commencing with Section 3156) and 4 (commencing with
Section 3179) of this title." 98 Chapters 3 and 4 of Title 15 deal with the
stop notice procedures for private and public works of improvement
respectively.
Lefcoe and Schaffer 99 submitted an ingenious argument for the
survival of the equitable lien that later worked some confusion on the
few courts confronted with Civil Code section 3264 and thereby served
92.

Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4.

93. Id. at 459.
94. Id. at 459 n.4.
95.

Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 789, § 2, at 2183 (repealed 1971) (current version at CAL. CIV.

CODE § 3097 (West 1974)).
96. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1362, § 2780 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3264 (West 1974)).
The new legislation received the approval of the governor on August 31, 1969 and was filed

with the Secretary of State on September 2, 1969. However, the operative date of the legislation was specified as January 1, 1971-15 months later. Civil Code § 3264 provides: "The
rights of all persons furnishing labor, services, equipment, or materials for any work of improvement, with respect to any fund for payment of construction costs, are governed exclusively by Chapters 3 (commencing with Section 3156) and 4 (commencing with Section
3179) of this title, and no person may assert any legal or equitable right with respect to such
fund, other than a right created by direct written contract between such person and the
person holding the fund, except pursuant to the provisions of such chapters."
97. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 789, § l(n), at 2183 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 3264
(West 1974)).
98. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3264 (West 1974).
99. Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4.
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to perpetuate attempts to make equitable claims upon the loan fund.
Addressing former Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1 subdivision
(n), their argument read as follows:
Despite its apparent inclusiveness, a court seeking to impose an
equitable lien will find little difficulty working around the statutory
imperatives. For instance, the above-quoted section bars equitable
liens against "any fund for payment of construction costs." But according to the terms of most construction loans, undisbursed funds
are no longer part of the construction fund after default. By the loan
terms, the lender retains the right to allocate undisbursed proceeds as
it sees fit. Thus the construction fund is converted, if the lender has
had his way, into a fund for the repayment of the loan. It is upon
this fund ("the construction fund") that courts could impose an equitable lien, notwithstanding the language of the statute.l°°
The courts first acknowledged the Lefcoe-Schaffer argument in
Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank.10 Swinerton was a building

contractor who contracted with the borrower, Casey, to construct a
work of improvement. Union Bank was the construction lender.
Casey defaulted on obligations to both the lender and Swinerton, and
the latter sought to enforce a lien in equity against unexpended loan
funds. Although the loan agreement between the lender and Casey
provided that, upon default, the lender could apply undisbursed loan
monies against the principal sum due from the borrowers, the bank
never applied the excess funds to that purpose and over $100,000 in
undisbursed funds remained in the loan account, $74,000 of which was
10 2
claimed by Swinerton.
The court held that an equitable lien was a remedy that inured to
the benefit of a general contractor as well as any subcontractor. Because the case presented sufficient evidence to establish each requirement necessary for the equitable remedy, Swinerton "became entitled
to the $74,000 withheld in the construction loan disbursement account
for payment of construction costs. 103 Citing Lefcoe and Schaffer, the
court stated that it did not read Civil Code section 3264 as indicative of
legislative opposition to the imposition of equitable liens against construction loan funds.104

Significantly, however, the court conceded that its interpretation
was, on the facts of this particular case, mere dictum. The legislature
had specifically provided that former Code of Civil Procedure section
100. Id. at 459 n.4. See text accompanying notes 150-54 infra.
101. 25 Cal. App. 3d 259, 265, 101 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (1972).
102. Id. at 262, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
103. Id. at 265, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
104. Id.
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1190.1 subdivision (n) "shall not apply to any work of improvement
1
commenced prior to [8 November 1967]. '"0s
Because the events in
Swinerton took place in 1964 and 1965, the court remained free to apply the judicially created remedy of the equitable lien, without statutory interference.1°6
The court in Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pacffic Financial Corp.,107 decided two and one half years later, did not have this
option. In Boyd, the court of appeal was for the first time directly confronted with the task of deciding the impact of Civil Code section 3264.
This time rather than attempting to assert an equitable lien directly
against the loan fund, the plaintiff sought to hold the lender liable for
negligently disbursing construction loan funds directly to other subcontractors and materialmen.' 08 The plaintiff did not seek recovery under
the mechanics' lien or stop notice statutes but, rather, sought recovery
in a negligence action.
The lender argued in turn that Civil Code section 3264 precluded
recovery on the facts, because the provisions of the statute constituted
the exclusive remedy in the absence of a direct written contract between the plaintiff and the lender. 10 9 No such contractual relationship
was alleged"O and, in light of Civil Code section 3264, the complaint
could not have been amended to state a cause of action outside of the
statute. The lender prevailed in the trial court and an appeal was taken
from a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer
without leave to amend.
The court of appeal recognized that a viable action for negligent
disbursement required that the lender must have owed some duty of
care to the plaintiff to disburse loan funds "in a particular manner, i.e.,
directly to the plaintiff.""' Hence, the plaintiff's claims regarding disbursements necessarily amounted to the assertion of a "'right with respect to [the construction loan] fund.' Such falls within the prohibition
105. Id. (quoting Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 789, § l(n), at 2183).
106. Id. at 265, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
107. 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1975).
108. Id. at 462, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
109. Id. at 463, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
110. The court of appeal succinctly disposed of any possible claim based on contract:
"Plaintiff does not and apparently cannot allege any 'direct written contract' between itself
and respondent [lender]. Hence no recovery can be had on the theory of a contract express
or implied." Id. The court observed that Civil Code § 3152 recognized actions against
persons with whom a claimant had contracted but noted that such contract actions involved
rights and liabilities of persons personally responsible on the original contract for labor and
materials. Id. at 463 n.1, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
111. Id. at 463, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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of section 3264."112
Viewing the literature, the court observed that most commentators
considered the imposition of equitable liens on a construction loan account to be a dead remedy in light of Civil Code section 3264. However, it acknowledged that other writers such as Lefcoe and Schaffer
argued that the legislature's enactment of former Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1 subdivision (n) was intended to abrogate further
judicial expansion of the equitable lien doctrine and that, when used to
prevent unjust enrichment, the equitable lien might still survive." 3 The
court also recognized that only two prior cases had considered the effect of Civil Code section 3264 and its predecessor, Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1 subdivision (n), since the enactment of the latter
section eight years earlier. Swinerton had merely held that the statute
did not operate retroactively,' 1 4 and the court of appeal's opinion in
Connol9 Development v. Superior Court," 5 though noting that "the enactment of section 3264 [Civil Code] abolished any theory of equitable
lien,"' 1 6 had been vacated on other grounds and granted a hearing by
the supreme court. Thus, the Boyd court was essentially writing upon a
clean slate when it expressed its conclusions as to the impact of section
3264:
We feel ... that the death of the equitable lien lends some stability
to the construction and lending industries .... A fair line is drawn
between the contractors, subcontractors, and materialmen on the one
hand and the construction lenders on the other. The former at least
have remedies by mechanic's lien against the property, unbonded
stop notice against the owner, and action upon the contract against
the person or persons personally ordering the labor or material. The
latter are relieved of the expense and risk of policing the ultimate
distribution of construction funds and can concentrate on their primary duty of providing construction loans at lesser expense to the
borrower and ultimately to the consuming public. Because of these
section 3264 abolishesall theories of equiconsiderations we hold that
117
table liens or trustfunds.
112. Id. at 464, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
113. Id.
114. Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank, 25 Cal. App. 3d 259, 101 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1972).
115. See Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 543, 116 Cal. Rptr. 191,
199 n.6 (1974), af/'dinpart,rev'd in part, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1976).
116. See Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Financial Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d
460, 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699, 701 (1975) (quoting Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 41
Cal. App. 3d 543, 116 Cal. Rptr. 191, 199 n.6 (1974), affd in par, rev'dinpart, 17 Cal. 3d
803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976)).
117. Id. at 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02 (emphasis added). The court also observed, in a
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Had the court in Boyd elected to stand on its firm declaration of

the impact of Civil Code section 3264 on the construction lending industry, claimants such as the plaintiff in that case would have simply"
walked away, wiser with the knowledge that they must avail themselves
of the statutory remedies or suffer the loss. Construction lenders could
have finally breathed a sigh of relief knowing that if they complied
with the statutes they need not defend against the plethora of theories

asserted by claimants neglectful of their rights. For reasons that are
unclear, however, the court chose to leave a glimmer of hope to those
adherents of the Lefcoe and Schaffer position: "Even if the theory of
Lefcoe and Schaffer is adopted and equitable liens are allowed to wipe

out windfall profits to either lender or borrower, the result in this case
is the same. No cause of action is stated. There is no allegation of
unjust enrichment."' 18
Although it seems clear that the court was merely posing a hypothetical to emphasize the hopelessness of plaintiffs case, such a com-

ment certainly permits a plausible inference that a viable cause of
action could be stated under the old equitable lien doctrine in cases

where unjust enrichment was alleged. Claimants are quick to point to
that flaw in the Boyd holding as justification for proposing unjust enrichment as well as other novel theories as supplements to the mechan-

ics' lien, stop notice, and contract rights. Yet, to draw that conclusion
would appear to be in direct contradiction to the court's unequivocal
holding that "section 3264 abolishes all theories of equitable liens." 9
Indeed, at least one other court'2 0 later alluded to the materiality of
unjust enrichment when evaluating the effect of Civil Code section

3264 by citing the Boyd case. Nonetheless when, after almost two years
of deliberation, the California Supreme Court handed down its exten-

sive analysis of the mechanics' lien and stop notice statutes in Connoly
Development, Inc. v. Superior Court,12 1 its footnote comment on Boyd
footnote, that materialmen and subcontractors would nonetheless have adequate protection
at law to enforce their right of payment. Id. at 465 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702. See also
Security Transactions, supra note 42, at 73: "In addition to the judicially created doctrine of
equitable liens, the labor or material supplier had three remedies available to him to secure
the payment for his labor or services, and the remedies are cumulative. These remedies are:
a recorded lien upon the property upon which the labor or materials supplier has bestowed
labor or furnished materials .... a stop notice served upon the lender or other holder of the
construction fund ... or a suit in contract against the owner or general contractor."
118. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 466, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
119. Id. at 465, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (emphasis added).
120. Pacific Coast Refrigeration, Inc. v. Badger, 52 Cal. App. 3d 233,245, 124 Cal. Rptr.
786, 793 (1975).
121. 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 CaL Rptr. 477 (1976).
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and the effect of section 3264 was concise and unequivocal:
Under the theory of equitable lien, the courts held that a person
who was induced to supply labor and materials in reliance upon the
construction loan fund could assert a lien against that fund. (See A-1
Door& MaterialsCo. v. Fresno Guar.Say. & Loan Ass'n. . . . ; Smith
v. Anglo-Clifornia Trust Co..... ) The enactment of Civil Code
section 3264 in 1969 abolished the nonstatutory equitable lien. (Boyd
) 122
& Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pacific FinancialCorp.
The supreme court's comment in Connolly is the last published
judicial interpretation of Civil Code Section 3264.
The Proper Scope of Civil Code Section 3264
The paucity of judicial treatment of Section 3264 has not permitted full explication of the underlying holdings of Boyd and Connolly
with regard to the numerous other legal and equitable rights often asserted by claimants. A comprehensive treatment of the statute requires,
therefore, discussion of both its specific provisions and their proper and
probable application to these theories.
Subdivision (n) of former Code of Civil Procedure section 1190.1
was specifically added to that section in 1967 and when it was later
recodified as Civil Code section 3264 in 1969, the change in statutory
language was minimal. As has already been noted, 23 the original statute referred to claimant's rights being governed by "this article" meaning then Article 2, Chapter 2, of Title 4. Civil Code section 3264
clarified the fact that "this article"' 24 referred to the stop notice remedy
by specifying the statutes by section: "Chapters 3 (commencing with
Section 3156) and 4 (commencing with Section 3179)."125 Otherwise,
the statutory language remained intact.
The language of Civil Code section 3264 is characterized by both
highly inclusive language and lack of equivocation. The class of persons to which the statute applies is stated to be "all persons furnishing
labor, services, equipment, or materials for any work of improvement." 2 6 Thus, by its terms the statute applies to laborers, materialmen, subcontractors, and even the general contractor. The significance
of this last category of claimant is that the general contractor does not
qualify as a person who is entitled to the stop notice remedy. 27
122. Id. at 827 n.23, 553 P.2d at 653, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (citations omitted).
123.

See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra.

124. See note 98 & accompanying text supra.
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3264 (West 1974).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127.

CAL,. CIv. CODE §§ 3158-3159 specify that the original contractor, see note 5 supra,
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Moreover, Civil Code section 3264 applies to such persons who
participate in any work of improvement, whether a single family dwelling or a massive construction project. Similarly, "work of improvement," as defined by Civil Code Section 3106128 is itself a broad
category of activity, including items ranging from alteration or repair
of virtually any structure in whole or in part to activities such as seeding and planting of shrubs.
The main qualifier of Civil Code section 3264 with regard to such
persons and activity is, however, that it is applicable to the fights of
such persons "with respect to any fund for payment of construction
costs."1 29 For the statute to apply, the claimant must be asserting a
right to payment from a fund designated as the source of payment for
the costs of constructing the work of improvement. The statute should
not, however, be read as addressed only to the narrow situation of the
claimant who specifically seeks imposition of an equitable lien. The
phrase "with respect to" does not mean simply a direct attack on the
loan fund itself. The language is broader in scope and appears to address indirect attacks as well. The basic test, so far as one may be discerned, appears to be whether the rights asserted focus on activities of
the construction lender undertaken with regard to the loan fund. In
other words, but for the lender's action vis-a-vis the loan account, the
cause of action could not be alleged. If such is the case, Civil Code
section 3264 applies to preclude recovery.
Claimants frequently attempt to circumvent the statute by setting
forth actions asserted as not being actions "with respect to such fund."
A plaintiff may argue that his is an independent tort action for the
lender's negligence in disbursing or concealing loan monies and not an
action against the fund itself. But, as was noted in Boyd, negligence
can only arise if there exists some duty of care owed to the claimant
is not among those persons entitled to the stop notice remedy. However, the language of §
3264 does not appear to turn on that fact and consequently seems to preclude the assertion
of legal and equitable rights to the loan fund by the general contractor. The contractor's
remedy for payment of money owing to him would be its contractual rights against the
owner or borrower of construction loan funds. Killen, Owner Liabliyfor Construction
Costs, 52 CAL. ST. BJ. 526 (1977). Section 3264, broadly construed, would prevent the
general contractor from asserting any rights to the loan fund except pursuant to a direct
written contract with the construction lender. To some, perhaps, such a reading may conflict
with the "settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be
given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the legislature
did not intend." Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 673, 423 P.2d 193, 198, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265,
270 (1967).
128. See note 1su.pra.
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3264 (West 1974).
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from the lender.' 30 The only duty shown within the context of the
Boyd case was one relating to the disbursement of loan funds in a particular manner and, hence, recovery for negligence must be based on
the assertion of a "right with respect to such fund."' 13 1 The court in
affirming the lower court's decision noted that section 3264 applies to
preclude recovery on the basis of any such alleged negligence of the
32
lender with regard to the fund.1
Concealment of loan funds is another frequent cause of action asserted. Application of the basic test reveals that the only duty which
could be breached would be a duty to disclose to the claimant the
lender's activities with regard to the construction loan fund.' 33 If such
a duty to disclose disbursement of loan funds existed and inured to all
claimants, the practical effect would be overwhelming. 134 Finding such
a general duty would also ignore the Boyd court's distinction between
the respective roles of contractor, subcontractor, and materialman on
the one hand and the construction lender on the other. 135 Most importantly, a cause of action for concealment could only be alleged with
regard to the lender's activity as to the loan fund and must necessarily
be the assertion of a right with respect to such fund. It would therefore
fall within the ambit of and be barred by section 3264. The same basic
reasoning should preclude other legal and equitable rights asserted to
the fund, such as negligent entrustment, constructive trust, and unjust
enrichment.
Section 3264, of course, does not give the lender license to engage
with impunity in tortious conduct. In an earlier Article, this author has
pointed out that statutes precluding actions against a construction
lender must be limited to those situations specifically addressed by the
130. Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Financial Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 460,
463, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699, 700 (1975).
131. Id. at 464, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
132. 12 BIEL & SENEKER, supra note 8, § 420.91[6]; 13 BIEL & SENEKER, supra note 8, §
452.03.
133. Cf.Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Financial Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d
460, 463, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699, 700 (1975) (allegation of negligent disbursement of loan fund).
134. For example, some larger construction projects require the participation of hundreds of laborers, materialmen and subcontractors. If the construction lender were required
to apprise each potential claimant of loan funds of the current status of the loan account, the
result would be an administrative nightmare. Generally, however, the mere entry into a
construction loan agreement, without more, does not create in either the general contractor
or any subcontractor or materialiman the status of a third party beneficiary in a position to
be entitled to such information. See Gordon Bldg. Corp. v. Gibralter Say. & Loan Ass'n,
247 Cal. App. 2d 1, 9-10, 55 Cal. Rptr. 884, 888-89 (1966); Smith v. Anglo-California Trust
Co., 205 Cal. 496, 502, 271 P. 898, 901 (1928); see note 141 & accompanying text infra.
135. See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
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particular statute. 136 Obligations and duties of the lender that arise independent of its role as lender are still enforceable. For example, if the
construction lender perpetrated actual fraud upon the claimant by representing that a claim would be paid without the necessity of serving a
stop notice, the lender could not then seek shelter behind section 3264
if the claimant, in reliance thereon, did not in fact serve the lender with
a stop notice. The fraud action would be independent of the lender's
role as a lender and the cause of action would not be barred.
Another possible separate cause of action, not turning on the
lender's management of the loan account, is recognized in the language
of the statute itself. Section 3264 provides that, other than the stop
notice, no legal or equitable right may be asserted with respect to such
fund "other than a right created by direct written contract between [the
claimant] and the person holding the fund." 137 That separate contractual remedy does not depend on the lender's management of loan funds
or, indeed, its role as a lender to the project. It is based upon and
supported by its own facts, the existence of the contract, just as the
earlier discussed fraud action.
However, the written contract exception to Civil Code section 3264
has given rise to its own special problems. The section specifies that
the only exception to its applicability is the existence of a "direct written contract" between the claimant and the lender. 138 Normally, when
a statute carves out a specific exception to its applicability it is assumed
139
that no other exceptions were intended by implication or otherwise.
With that concept in mind, a question arises as to the purpose and
meaning of the modifier "direct."
"Direct" has been defined as "operating by immediate connection
or relation

ence."

40

. .

. [w]ithout any intervening medium, agency or influ-

Indeed, the legislature's use of the word "direct" precedent to

136. Gutierrez, Liability of a Construction Lender Under Civil Code Section 3434: An
Amorphous Epitaph to Connor v Great Western Savings & Loan Association, 8 PAC. L.J. 1,
13-16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GuTERREz].
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3264 (West 1974).
138. Id.
139. Under the maxim of Expressio Unius Est ExclusioAterius,if a statute specifies one
exception to a general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other
exceptions or effects are excluded. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (4th rev. ed. 1968). See
generally45 CAL. JuR. 2d Statutes § 133 (1958). Too, the rules of statutory construction are
such that the intent behind the legislature's action is determined from the language of the
statute read as a whole, and, if the words used are reasonably free of uncertainty, the court
will look no further than the statute itself to ascertain its meaning. Rosenthal v. Hansen, 34
Cal. App. 3d 754, 760, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257, 261 (1973).
140. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 546 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
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"written contract" clearly implies an intention to preclude assertion of
the requisite relationship by way of a circuitous route: claiming to be a
third party beneficiary to a contract, 141 or alleging the existence of an
agency, for example. The exception to the mandate of section 3264,
therefore, is simply that, other than the stop notice remedy, a claimant
to the construction loan fund may only assert a right based upon a
contractual relationship which (1) is a writing sufficient to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, 142 and (2) is a contract directly between the claimant
and the lender regarding payments to the claimant from the loan
fund.143

In sum, the restrictive effect of section 3264 provides needed stability to the construction lending industry. 144 Section 3264 contemplates a claimant's knowledge of the remedies available to protect his
rights;1 45 failure to avail itself of those rights can no longer be cured by
alleging alternative legal or equitable theories to attack the loan fund.
The leading remedy available to laborers and materialmen in addition to the mechanics' lien or contract remedies is the stop notice.
The stop notice is an extraordinary remedy and effects an equitable
garnishment on the fund.'"6 If accompanied by a sufficient bond, the
141. For a person to assert the status of a third party beneficiary that person must have
been expressly understood and intended to be the beneficiary of the contract. "Expressly,"
for the purposes of determining that status means "in an express manner, in direct or unmistakeable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly." Shepard v. Miles & Sons, Inc., 10 Cal. App.
3d 7, 15, 89 Cal. Rptr. 23, 28 (1970). In Gordon Bldg. Corp. v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
247 Cal. App. 2d 1,9, 55 Cal. Rptr. 884, 888 (1966), the court, in denying third party beneficiary status to a general contractor, commented: "A contract made solely for the benefit of
the contracting parties cannot be enforced by a stranger or one who stands to benefit merely
incidentally by its performance."
142. See Franklin v. Hansen, 59 Cal. 2d 570, 573-74, 381 P.2d 386, 388, 30 Cal. Rptr.
530, 532 (1963).
143. But f. Benson Elec. Co. v. Hale Bros. Assocs., 246 Cal. App. 2d 686, 55 Cal. Rptr.
73 (1966) and Halspar, Inc. v. La Barthe, 238 Cal. App. 2d 897, 48 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1965)
where, in interpreting former CAL. CODE Cwv. PROC. § 1193(a) (West 1954) (current version
at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3097 (West 1974)), the courts held that the statute was satisfied if a lien
claimant contracted directly with the lessee of property and if the lessor knew of the construction under the contract but failed to file a notice of nonresponsibility. See CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 3094, 3129 (West 1974). The courts held that in such cases the claimant had a
"direct contract with the owner" for the purposes of the statute. Application of those holdings to the construction lender and the claimant may be inappropriate in that the owner's
knowledge of construction on his property and the lender's knowledge of a claim to construction loan funds are not analogous situations.
144. MARSH, supra note 2, § 5.27.
145. See Gutierrez, supra note 136, at 12 n.69. But see Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4,
at 441.
146. Systems Inv. Corp. v. National Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1061,
102 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380 (1972). But see Burden, supra note 22, at 234.
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lender has no choice but to withhold funds from the balance of the loan
account adequate to meet the stop notice claim. It is cumulative and
can be pursued even if it is not the only remedy asserted.147 If all the
prerequisites are met, a stop notice claim creates a lien on the entire
fund remaining in the lender's possession and not merely the installment due when the stop notice is received. 148 An actual problem may
arise, however, when the stop notice is received and no funds remain in
the loan account, leaving no funds to be garnished by the stop notice.
The stop notice remedy in such a circumstance affords the claimant no
protection. If, however, construction funds remain, the lender may not
apply those funds to the balance due on the loan in disregard of a properly served bonded stop notice. Failure of a claimant to comply fully
with the stop notice procedure will otherwise permit the lender to set
off undistributed loan funds against the debt of the borrower in accord149
ance with the typical construction loan agreement.
As noted earlier, Lefcoe and Schaffer suggested that an equitable
lien might still exist in the latter situation against the unexpended loan
proceeds.150 They reasoned that upon the borrower's default the loan
fund was transmuted into a fund other than one for payment of construction costs. Because a construction loan agreement might provide
for the use of the funds by the lender in ways other than construction,
such as against principal and overdue interest, the authors took the position that the fund was lifted out of the mandate of the statute and,
hence, subject to an equitable lien to prevent an unjust enrichment. 151
This argument ignores the fact, however, that unexpended loan funds
may be applied to the completion of an unfinished construction project. 152 Regardless of the manner in which the funds are applied, what
appears to this author to be the essential issue is the purpose for which
the construction loan account was originally established and not how it
might later be characterized after default. But for the creation of the
construction-costs loan account the claimant would not be entitled to
any money from the holder of the fund. 53 Thus, a fund created at the
13 BIEL & SENEI.ER, supranote 8, § 452.02.
Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 265 Cal. App. 2d 490, 497,
Rptr. 422, 427 (1968).
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFONIA MEcHANICs' LIENS & OTHER
REMEDIES § 8.32 (1972).
150. See Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 459 n.4.
151. Id.
152. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIENS & OTHER
REMEDIES § 8.33 (1972).
153. See Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank, 25 Cal. App. 3d 259, 265, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 665, 669 (1972).
147.
148.
71 Cal.
149.
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outset for payment of construction costs maintains its character as long
as monies exist. That the assertion of a claim with respect to such a
fund should fall within the prohibition of section 3264 would seem to
be true regardless of the stage of the construction project, including
54
upon and after default by the borrower.1
There is, of course, logical appeal on behalf of lien claimants who
in some cases will not receive payment for their labor and materials
supplied to a construction project. Such persons have to some varying
degree enhanced the construction lender's security interest. Likewise,
the pursuasiveness and attractiveness of making the lender an insurer
of payments to lien claimants is, as Justice Sims commented in
McBain, 155 easy to recognize. The frustrating effect of permitting the
lender to retain unexpended loan funds possibly in excess of the
amount required to repay the principal debt, interest and costs, while
some laborers and materialmen go unpaid, is obvious. Much of the socalled unjust-enrichment argument does not, however, recognize the
lender's actual function with regard to the construction project.
The construction loan is normally secured by a first deed of trust
on the real property in its unimproved state. All labor and materials
supplied to the project after construction begins, to some degree, enhances the lender's security. If construction stops with the improvement unfinished, the lender must be able to take steps to preserve its
right to repayment of the debt amount plus interest, as well as any costs
incurred through foreclosure and, if appropriate, completion of the
project. 156 The limited role of the lender in construction enterprise is
often blurred in the the eyes of others by contemplation of the extraordinary amounts of money that most institutional lenders deal
in. 157 Consequently, it has been suggested that construction lenders are
154. Cf Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 444: "mhe term 'unjust enrichment' is
usually reserved for the case in which a man receives something for nothing, not for the
situation in which he innocently pays someone (other than his agent) who then absconds.
Strictly speaking, a lender could not be said to have been unjustly enriched as long as he had
extended funds to the borrower for the full value of the project at the date of default. If
lenders are to be compelled to pay a second time, it must be on another theory."
155. McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 848, 51 Cal. Rptr.
78, 90 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
156. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIENS & OTHER
REMEDIES § 8.32 (1972).
157. When claims against lenders are allowed on nonstatutory grounds, commentators
argue that the courts have utilized a risk spreading device of the type characterizing the law
of strict products liability. See, e.g., Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 458: "[C]onstruction
lenders typically have deeper pockets than materialmen, and are in a better position to distribute these losses in smaller chunks to shareholders, depositors, and borrowers." See also
Gutierrez, supra note 136, at 13 n.75.
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in a position to actively participate in the construction project beyond
their primary function of loaning money at interest on the security of
real property. 15 8 The flaw in this argument is that placing additional
obligations on construction lenders, such as to ensure that claimants are
paid or that the work performed is not defective, may have the result of
exposing lenders to unexpected liability for the entire construction effort.1 59 The foreseeable and unfortunate consequences of placing unbargained-for risk on the lender are higher rates of interest, more
restrictive loan policies, and the inevitable squeezing-out of smaller developers. For this reason one recent decision 160 has refused to recognize any "modem trend" of law dictating the creation of duties and
obligations of the lender beyond its normal function as lender of
money.161
Conclusion
Claimants seeking to enforce an entitlement to loan funds through
means other than the bonded stop notice or a direct written contract
with the lender must confront the language of Civil Code Section 3264.
The statute as currently written provides that a lender performing its
function as a lender of money in accordance with law should be entitled to the benefit of its bargain and not be subjected to collateral attacks on its security) 62 Likewise, if claimants make prudent use of the
statutes that afford them protection they will receive payment1 63 for
their labor or materials by way of a known and powerful remedyI64-- the bonded stop notice. If there are undisbursed funds in the
construction loan account, the claimant's recovery, in whole or in
part, 165 is assured; if not, all participants lose. Section 3264 provides
that a lender will not have to meet and defend against the varied claims
of each laborer or materialman who did not use the remedies provided
for his protection. Indeed, construction lenders may not be aware of
the existence of every laborer or materialman who contributes to the
158. See Lefcoe & Schaffer, supra note 4, at 442.
159. Gutierrez, supra note 136, at 22-24.
160. Kinner v. World Say. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 724, 129 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1976).
161. Id. at 730, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
162. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West 1970).
163. Stop notice claimants share on a pro rata basis in unexpended loan funds. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 3167 (West 1974); Hunt, The Stop Notice Remedy in California, 37 L.A.B.
BULL. 16, 19 (1962).
164. Miller, Validity of the Stop Notice As a Summary Remedy, 48 CAL. ST. BJ. 44
(1973).
165. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3167 (West 1974).
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construction project or may not know, without the receipt of a stop
notice, who claims entitlement to construction loan funds.' 66 To force
a lender, through artful pleading, to compromise or defend against legal or equitable claims specifically precluded by section 3264 is to defeat the statute's purpose. The policy behind affording lenders the
protection of section 3264 was concisely articulated in Boyd:
[Tihe death of the equitable lien ... [relieves construction lenders]
of the expense and risk of policing the ultimate distribution of construction funds and [they] can concentrate on their primary duty of
providing construction loans at lesser
expense to the borrower and
167
ultimately to the consuming public.
If the result is to leave some claimants unpaid while a lender receives unexpended loan funds over and above that provided for in its
contract with the borrower, then legislative action may be necessary to
balance the equities. However, courts must deal with the statutes as
they presently exist. In addressing a cause of action that falls within
the basic test of the applicability of Civil Code section 3264, they must
yield to the statutory mandate which prevents the assertion of other
legal or equitable rights to the loan fund regardless of the sufficiency of
the cause of action as a pleading.

166. Miller, Validity ofthe Stop Notice as a Summary Remedy, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 44, 47
(1973).
167. Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Western Pac. Financial Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 460,
465, 118 Cal. Rptr. 699, 701-02 (1975).

